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The radical left at the 2014 European Parliament election: a first assessment 
The publication of the final results of the 2014 European Parliament (EP) election of 22-25 
finally perwiths to draw a first assessment of the performance of the radical left.1 
The election marked an important electoral advance for this party family, which won 
12,981,378 votes (+1,885,574) corresponding to 7.96% of valid votes (+1.04%). This was 
matched by an even stronger increase of radical left Members of the European Parliament 
(MEPs), from 36 to 53, and of their parliamentary group (European United Left/Nordic Green 
left - GUE/NGL), from 35 to 52.2 
On the negative side, the radical left failed to hit some key strategic targets. In terms of 
seats, the GUE/NGL did not fulfil the overblown expectations of some early opinion polls3 
and did not reach the status of third largest force in the coming European Parliament. In 
terms of votes, its growth was overshadowed by the much stronger gains of far right 
Eurosceptic parties.  
1. Electoral Results: Important But Uneven Gains 
The aggregate score4 of radical left parties in European Parliament elections reached in 2014 
(7.96%) its zenith since the fall of really-existing socialism, beyond the previous peaks of 
1999 (7.59%) and 2009 (6.92%).  
The electoral gains, however, were not evenly distributed across the continent (see TABLE 
1). In fourteen countries the radical left improved its support but in twelve countries it 
suffered instead moderate or heavy losses.5 
 
                                            
1
  All data are retrieved from the relevant official national source (usually the Ministry of Interior); results are still  
 provisional in a few countries. 
2
   The two categories do not entirely overlap. On the one hand, some red-green (e.g. the Danish SF) or  
 regionalist (e.g. in Spain) radical left parties, as well as most ecologist deputies elected within radical left  
 coalitions (e.g. the Catalonia ICV), have often opted to sit with the Green group. On the other hand, other kinds  
 of parties have sometimes joined the GUE/NGL group for technical reasons (in 2014 the Danish Eurosceptic  
 coalition, the German and Dutch animalists and an Irish independent).       
3
 Cunningham, K., Hix, S. (2014) “Socialist marginally ahead, radical left up to third”, 5 March 2014,  
 http://www.electio2014.eu/it/pollsandscenarios/pollsblog  
4
  This is the sum-total of radical left votes divided by the total valid votes expressed in the EU countries. The use   
 of aggregate (or weighted) figures is preferable to that of unweighted simple averages of national results, as the  
 latter tend to distort the overall size of party families. 
5
  In Malta the radical left was absent both times, Croatia was not yet a member in 2009 (but the radical left lost  
 heavily compared to the 2012 EP election). 





TABLE 1. RADICAL LEFT RESULTS, 2009-2014 
 Votes 2009 Votes 2014 Change share 2009 share 2014 Change 
AUSTRIA 18,926 60,451 +41,525 0.66% 2.14% +1.48% 
BELGIUM 107,046 235,092 +128,046 1.63% 3.51% +1.88% 
BULGARIA 0 14,231 +14,231 0.00% 0.64% +0.64% 
CROATIA -  34,380 -  - 3.73% - 
CYPRUS 106,922 70,130 -36,792 34.90% 27.09% -7.82% 
CZECH R. 334,577 175,027 -159,550 14.18% 11.55% -2.63% 
DENMARK 371,603 248,244 -123,359 16.38% 10.92% -5.46% 
ESTONIA 3,519 226 -3,293 0.89% 0.07% -0.82% 
FINLAND 109,948 167,006 +57,058 6.60% 9.66% +3.06% 
FRANCE 2,165,037 1,554,647 -610,390 12.57% 8.20% -4.37% 
GERMANY 2,004,500 2,220,724 +216,224 7.61% 7.57% -0.05% 
GREECE 718,790 1,934,025 +1,215,235 14.02% 33.82% +19.81% 
HUNGARY 27,817 0 -27,817 0.96% 0.00% -0.96% 
IRELAND 256,123 377,128 +121,005 14.00% 22.77% +8.77% 
ITALY 2,162,215 1,108,457 -1,053,758 7.06% 4.04% -3.02% 
LATVIA 0 6,817 +6,817 0.00% 1.55% +1.55% 
LITHUANIA 13,341 0 -13,341 2.43% 0.00% -2.43% 
LUXEMBOURG 9,740 14,773 +5,034 4.91% 7.25% +2.34% 
MALTA 0 0 0 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 
NETHERLANDS 330,802 458,079 +127,277 7.26% 9.64% +2.37% 
POLAND 51,872 0 -51,872 0.70% 0.00% -0.70% 
PORTUGAL 810,571 636,833 -173,738 24.32% 20.96% -3.36% 
ROMANIA 0 9,803 +9,803 0.00% 0.18% +0.18% 
SLOVAK R. 13,643 10,287 -3,356 1.65% 1.83% +0.18% 
SLOVENIA 0 28,700 +28,700 0.00% 7.14% +7.14% 
SPAIN 823,329 3,174,027 +2,350,698 5.27% 20.78% +15.51% 
SWEDEN 182,140 234,358 +52,218 5.75% 6.31% +0.56% 
UK 463,344 207,933 -255,411 3.06% 1.26% -1.80% 
TOTAL 11,085,805 12,981,378 +1,895,574 6.92% 7.96% +1.03% 
VALID VOTES 160,105,511 163,109,024 +3,003,513 41.42% 41.17% -0.24% 
 
Successes were spectacular in several states of the periphery. In Greece the radical left 
soared to 33.82% of valid votes (+19.81%), becoming the largest national party family. This 
result was driven by the hefty gains of SYRIZA (26.57%), which confirmed its scores of the 
june 2012 national election and overcame the conservatives as the first Greek party. In Spain 
the radical left rose to 20.78% (+15.51%) thanks to the excellent debut of the far left list 
PODEMOS and strong gains of Izquierda Unida and the left-regionalist alliance Los Pueblos 
Deciden. In Ireland the division of the Trotskyist far left led to the loss of the seat of the 
Socialist Party but the rise of the left-nationalist Sinn Féin pushed the total radical left score 





to 22.77% (+8.77%). In Slovenia, finally, the 2012-2013 anti-austerity protests provoked the 
emergence of a previously inexistent electoral radical left (Združena levica and Solidarnost) 
which scored 7.14%, although it failed to gain parliamentary representation. 
These gains in medium-small nations, however, were partially erased by stagnating or 
negative results in the large states of the centre. Particularly negative were the results in the 
three countries: France (8.20%, -4.37%), where the Front de Gauche barely grew and the far-
left NPA practically disappeared; Italy (4.04%, -3.02%), where the coming together of the 
whole radical left spectrum and several external allies in the coalition L’Altra Europa con 
Tsipras (AET) did reach its main target – a re-entry in the EP after five years of absence – but 
almost halved their previous electoral capital; and the UK (1.26%, -1.80%), where traditional 
far left groups almost didn’t bother to run and obtained a mere 0.29% of valid votes  - the 
remaining 0.97% was won by the Northern Irish Sinn Féin. Heavy losses were also sustained 
in the radical left strongholds of Cyprus (27.09%, -7.82%), where the communist AKEL paid 
the price of the 2012-2013 financial crisis, Denmark (10.92%, -5.46%), where the eco-
socialist SF did not repeat the feat of the previous election, and Portugal (20.96%, -3.36%), 
where CDU and PCTP/MRPP somewhat gained but the BE more than halved. 
This unevenness springs from the interaction of two main trends. 
On the one hand, European Parliament elections clearly remain second order elections6 
dominated by national issues and calculation. The marked innovations of the 2014 campaign 
– the selection by the main Europarties of Spitzenkandidaten for the role of President of the 
European Commission; televised debates between the main candidates – seem to have had 
a minimal impact in this respect, as the results of each party family have remained very 
inhomogeneous and voters’ participation has remained extremely low.7 The only true 
element of “Europeanisation” of this election can be found, paradoxically, in the growth of 
parties critical of the current status of the European integration project: this dissatisfaction, 
however, has assumed highly different forms in each country, rewarding from case to case 
the far right (e.g. the French FN), right-wing nationalists (e.g. the British UKIP and the Danish 
DF), unclassable populists (the Italian M5S) and the radical left. 
On the other hand, the increasing polarisation of European nation-states on macro-
economic lines (a richer and exporting centre vs. a poorer and semi-insolvent periphery) has 
partially reflected on the radical left vote. While in the former results have generally been 
lukewarm, in the latter the radical left has often consolidated scores beyond 20% of the valid 
votes, strongly growing in Greece, Ireland and Spain and preserving an important audience 
in Cyprus and Portugal.   
2. Parliamentary Representation: A Larger But Somewhat Heterogeneous Group 
The electoral growth described in the previous paragraph has translated into very large gains 
of MEPs (see TABLE 2). Total radical left seats have risen from 36 (4.89%) to 53 (7.06%); 
GUE/NGL seats from 35 (4.76%) to 52 (6.92%).  
 
                                            
6
 Reif, K., Schwitht, H. (1980) “Nine second-order national elections – a conceptual framework of European 
election results”, European Journal of Political Research, 8(1), 3-44. 
7
 The overall share of valid votes over registered votes has further shrunk – slightly – from 41.42% to 41.17%. 
More worryingly, this share is below 35% in most Eastern European (Bulgaria, Croatia, Czech Republic, 
Hungary, Latvia, Poland, Romania, Slovak Republic, Slovenia) and a few Western European (Portugal, UK) 
countries, calling into question the quality of the European Parliament’s democratic legitimation.    





TABLE 2. GUE/NGL PARLIAMENTARY GROUP, 2009-2014 
 Seats 2009 Seats  2014 
CYPRUS AKEL (2) AKEL (2) 
CZECH R. KSČM (4) KSČM (3) 
DENMARK Folkeb. (1) Folkeb. (1) 
FINLAND - VAS (1) 
France Front de Gauche (4), AOM (1) Front de Gauche (3), AOM (1) 
GERMANY DIE LEFTWING (8) DIE LEFTWING (7), Tierschutz (1) 
GREECE KKE (2), SYRIZA (1) SYRIZA (6) 
IRELAND Sinn Féin (1) Sinn Féin (3), Mike Flanagan (1) 
ITALY - AET-ind. (2), AET-PRC (1) 
LATVIA LSP (1) - 
NETHERLANDS SP (2) SP (2), PvdD (1) 
PORTUGAL BE (3), PCP (2) PCP (3), BE (1) 
SPAIN IU (1) IU (5), Podemos (5), EH Bildu (1) 
SWEDEN V (1) V (1) 
UK Sinn Féin (1) Sinn Féin (1) 
GUE-NGL 35 / 736  (4.76%) 52 / 751   (6.92%) 
COUNTRIES 13 / 27 14 / 28 
Notes: bold = members of the PEL; italics = technical allies. 
The GUE/NGL parliamentary group has expanded thanks to the net gains of existing 
members (+3 MEPs), the affiliation of previously non-represented radical left parties (+13 
MEPs) and technical agreements with a few other non-leftist parties (+3 MEPs), while losing 
2 MEPs due to the disaffiliation of the Greek KKE.  
Despite these gains, the group remains relatively uninfluential within the European 
Parliament. Its overall size has increased only marginally, from the sixth to the fifth position 
(above the Greens). Its geographical representation, likewise, has increased from 13 to 14 
countries (with the comeback of Italy and Finland and the loss of Latvia) and covers only half 
of the EU member states. 
An additional challenge will be represented by a significant degree of internal hetero-
geneity.8  
One important division will be that between parties affiliated to the Party of the European 
Left (PEL)9 (24 MEPs), other radical left organisations (25 MEPs) and technical allies (3 MEPs). 
The former, created in 2004, has consistently sought to strengthen the coordination the 
radical left within the EU institutions on “modernist” (downplaying their communist roots) 
and “Euro-constructive” (attacking the main thrust of EU policies but supporting the 
progress of European integration) lines; this has often created tensions within the GUE/NGL, 
                                            
8
  The organisation VoteWatch Europe (http://www.votewatch.eu/), for instance, points out that the voting 
cohesion rate of the GUE/NGL in the past legislature was the lowest of all groups save the EFD (79.37%). This 
rate is likely to sink further in the coming legislature. 
9
  See Dunphy, R., March, L. (2013) “Seven year itch? The European Left Party: struggling to transform the EU”, 
Perspectives on European Politics and Society, 14:4, 520-534. 





which retains a confederal character in order to accommodate the large ideological and 
programmatic differences between its member-parties. The latest move of the PEL, which 
has fielded Alexis Tsipras (SYRIZA) as candidate for president of the Commission, has indeed 
evoked much sympathy within the GUE/NGL but at the same time risks to alienate the more 
radical and Eurosceptic radical left parties – as the defection of the KKE to the non-attached 
MEPs indicates. 
Another key question is the transversal rift around the issue of Euroscepticism, which 
requires delicate balancing acts both within the group and within most individual parties.10 
The deepening of the Eurocrisis has somewhat sharpened the strategic elaboration and 
debate on the issue, as supporters of a reformed “social Europe” are increasingly pitted 
against advocates of a weakening or breakup of the EU, considered as a necessary step to 
free their countries from neo-liberal external constraints and to adopt progressive national 
macro-economic policies. The latter position is supported by several orthodox communist 
(KKE, PCP, AKEL), radical left (V) and other (Folkb.) parties, as well as by internal minorities in 
other parties. These forces, however, are themselves divided on the opportunity of explicitly 
calling for an exit from the Eurozone and the EU, as opposed to a partial renegotiation of 
existing comwithments. 
 
3. Past And Present 
The long-term trajectory of the radical left in European Parliament elections is portrayed in 
TABLE 3. From the crisis and electoral decline of the Communist-dominated “old” radical left 
in the 1984-1994 decade (from 15.00% to 7.08%) emerged a reconfigured “new” radical left, 
which has since stagnated around 7-8% of total valid votes. 
TABLE 3. HISTORICAL EVOLUTION, 1979-2014 
 1979 1984 1989 1994 1999 2004 2009 2014 
Valid votes 60.15% 56.93% 56.40% 54.43% 47.27% 43.75% 41.42% 41.17% 
RL votes (%) 14.80% 15.00% 11.48% 7.08% 7.59% 6.86% 6.92% 7.96% 
EP seats (n.) 410 434 518 567 626 732 736 751 
RL seats (n.) 46 43 45 29 43 42 36 53 
RL seats (%) 11.22% 9.91% 8.69% 5.11% 6.87% 5.74% 4.89% 7.06% 
GUE seats 
(n.) 
44 41 42 28 42 41 35 52 
GUE seats 
(%) 
10.73% 9.45% 8.11% 4.94% 6.71% 5.60% 4.76% 6.92% 
GUE 
countries 
3/9 4/10 7/12 5/12 10/15 14/25 13/27 14/28 
 
This trend was determined by two main components: growth and decline within existing EU 
members and the effects of the successive EU enlargements (see TABLE 4).  
                                            
10
 See Dunphy, R. (2004) Contesting capitalism? Left parties and European integration. Manchester: Manchester 
University Press, and Charalambous, G. (2011) “All the shades of red: examining the radical left’s 
Euroscepticism”, Contemporary Politics, 17(3), 299-320.  





In the original nine member-states the radical left swiftly declined from 1984 (14.93% of 
valid votes) to 1994 (4.25%), slowly recovered until 2009 (6.74%) and then fell again in 2014 
(5.14%). The determinant factor was here the crisis of French and Italian communism, which 
was not sufficiently compensated by the growth of other radical left forces (e.g. the SP in the 
Netherlands or the PDS/Die Leftwing in Western Germany).  
The 1981-1995 waves of enlargement, however, brought into the EU territories (including 
Eastern Germany) with radical lefts which had withstood better the collapse of the Soviet 
Union and were in average much stronger than their counterparts. The electoral results of 
this second group somewhat declined from 1999 (12.29%) to 2009 (10.33%) but swiftly 
soared in 2014 (19.30%). Despite having only one-third of the population of the first group of 
countries, they contributed more than half of all radical left votes. 
The 2004-2013 waves of enlargement, on the contrary, saw the accession of countries with 
very weak radical lefts: these totalled in 2014 only 1.52% of valid votes. Within the former 
Eastern bloc the collapse of really-existing socialism left behind many former communist 
parties which successfully reconverted to social-liberalism but, with the exception of the 
neo-communist Czech KSČM, practically no viable radical left force. The only positive gain 
was Cyprus, where the communist AKEL managed to preserve and even increase its 
considerable electoral weight.   
TABLE 4. EFFECTS OF THE THREE WAVES OF ENLARGEMENT 
 1979 1999 2014 
EU members in 1979 (Belgium, France, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, West Germany, 
Denmark, Ireland, UK) 
Registered voters (n.) 184,474,494 207,497,569 222,958,570 
Valid votes (%) 60.15% 45.07% 45.64% 
Radical left votes (n.) 16,425,278 5,052,995 5,233,556 
Radical left votes (%) 14.80% 5.40% 5.14% 
1981-1995 enlargements (Greece, Portugal, Spain, East Germany & Berlin, Austria, Finland, 
Sweden)  
Registered voters (n.)  82,168,563 85,609,547 
Valid votes (%)  52.83% 44.78% 
Radical left votes (n.)  5,333,517 7,398,221 
Radical left votes (%)  12.29% 19.30% 
2004-2013 enlargements (Cyprus, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, 
Poland, Slovak Republic, Slovenia, Bulgaria, Romania, Croatia) 
Registered voters (n.)   87,605,149 
Valid votes (%)   26.28% 
Radical left votes (n.)   349,601 
Radical left votes (%)   1.52% 
 
The 2014 EP election delineates a clear division of the contemporary European radical left in 
three relatively homogeneous geo-political macro-areas. 
 





Across most Western Europe the radical left tends to be a medium-sized party family with 
some parliamentary representation and electoral scores between 4% and 10%. Negative 
exceptions are the extremely weak parties of the UK and Austria;11 Belgium is slightly below 
the norm but growing rapidly; a somewhat positive exception of instead Denmark.12  
The Mediterranean and Atlantic periphery, on the contrary, has become the vanguard of the 
present influence and future prospects of the radical left. The mix of a severe socio-
economic crisis, large anti-austerity mobilisations and the presence well-rooted political 
organisations of different kinds, from orthodox communist to left-reformist and left-
nationalist, has pushed electoral scores well above 20% of valid votes: since the beginning in 
Cyprus, since 2009 in Portugal, in 2014 in Greece, Spain and Ireland.  
The former Eastern European regions, finally, resemble an archipelago of a few localised 
strongholds – Eastern Germany (19.74%) and the Czech Republic (11.55%), recently joined 
by Slovenia (7.14%) – in a sea of almost complete absence. 
 
4. Future Prospects 
This picture entails both opportunities and dangers. 
At the level of formal EU institutional dynamics, the radical left is unlikely to leave a signifi-
cant mark on the future course of EU policies. Within the European Parliament the European 
People’s Party (EPP) and the Progressive Alliance of Socialists and Democrats (S&D) groups, 
despite their losses, still enjoy a comfortable parliamentary majority (413 seats out of 751); 
conversely, an unlikely centre-left alliance of S&D, Greens and GUE/NGL (294 seats) falls 
much short of the required majority. Within the Council, likewise, the radical left influence 
will probably remain negligible: its past involvement as leader of one national government 
(Cyprus, 2007-2013) and junior partner in several other cabinets has passed almost 
unnoticed. Even a future electoral victory in Greece will probably have little effect, due to 
the small size of the country and the post-Lisbon expansion of qualified majority voting. 
Things are different, however, if we look at the possible evolution of national political 
situations. 
In several countries of the Southern and Celtic periphery the radical left is rapidly coming out 
of its previous marginality and now faces an historic opportunity to establish itself as the 
largest party family and become the leading partner of governmental coalitions. In Greece 
SYRIZA is likely to win the next general elections and, if the current crisis-cum-austerity will 
continue, it is no more inconceivable to foresee a further collapse of existing ruling parties 
and similar exploits of the radical left in countries like Cyprus, Ireland, Spain and Portugal.  
At present, radical left parties appear to be quite unprepared for this eventuality. Partisan 
divisions heavily hinder the establishment of effective united fronts both for the present 
opposition and for a future governmental majority. The thorny problem of the relationship 
with the social-liberal left continues to prove divisive and risks snatching defeat from the 
jaws of victory, confining the most intransigent forces to a splendid isolation and the most 
                                            
11
  The radical left of Luxembourg failed to gain representation due to the small size of the national contingent (6  
  MEPs) but scored a healthy 7.25% of valid votes. 
12
  The figure retained is that of the SF (radical left but affiliated to the Green group), with 10.92% of valid votes; in  
  addition, the Eurosceptic movement Folkb. (cross-party but mainly supported by the far-left E, affiliated to the  
  GUE/NGL) gained 8.07% of valid votes.   
